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Editor’s key points
† The World Health
Organization’s Surgical
Safety Checklist was
introduced to improve
perioperative morbidity,
mortality, and adherence
to clinical protocols.
† The role of changes in
safety culture in the
positive effects of this
checklist was assessed in a
prospective controlled
intervention survey in
operating theatre
personnel.
† Successful checklist
implementation had
limited impact on patient
safety culture in this
single-site study, for
unclear reasons that
require further study.
Background. Positive changes in safety culture have been hypothesized to be one of the
mechanisms behind the reduction in mortality and morbidity after the introduction of
the World Health Organization’s Surgical Safety Checklist (SSC). We aimed to study the
checklist effects on safety culture perceptions in operating theatre personnel using a
prospective controlled intervention design at a single Norwegian university hospital.
Methods. We conducted a study with pre- and post-intervention surveys using the
intervention and control groups. The primary outcome was the effects of the Norwegian
version of the SSC on safety culture perceptions. Safety culture was measured using the
validated Norwegian version of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture.
Descriptive characteristics of operating theatre personnel and checklist compliance data
were also recorded. A mixed linear regression model was used to assess changes in
safety culture.
Results. The response rate was 61% (349/575) at baseline and 51% (292/569) post-
intervention. Checklist compliance ranged from 77% to 85%. We found signiﬁcant
positive changes in the checklist intervention group for the culture factors ‘frequency of
events reported’ and ‘adequate stafﬁng’ with regression coefﬁcients at 20.25 [95%
conﬁdence interval (CI), 20.47 to 20.07] and 0.21 (95% CI, 0.07–0.35), respectively.
Overall, the intervention group reported signiﬁcantly more positive culture scores—
including at baseline.
Conclusions. Implementation of the SSC had rather limited impact on the safety culture
within this hospital.
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An estimated 234 million major surgical operations are per-
formed annually worldwide.1 As volume and importance of
surgery in global healthcare increase, patient safety and
quality in surgical care gain more attention.2 3 Nearly one
in 10 in-hospital patients experience iatrogenic events and
more than half of them occur within perioperative care.4
In 2008, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched
the Safe Surgery Saves Lives campaign and produced the
‘Surgical Safety Checklist’ (SSC) designed to reduce
complications and deaths associated with surgery.5 In an
international pilot study, the SSC intervention resulted in a
decrease in mortality (1.5–0.8%) and morbidity (17–11%).6
Similar effects were found after implementing the more
comprehensive Surgical Patient Safety System (SURPASS)
checklist on patient outcomes in the Netherlands.7 An import-
ant purpose of introducing the WHO SSC was to improve basic
clinical processes as shown by the increase in appropriate
antibiotic use from 56% to 83%, correct site marking from
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54% to 92%, and overall clinical safety processes from 34% to
57%, suggesting improved reliability in clinical care.6
Within the healthcare and other industries, checklists
are more than a simple intervention. At a basic level, they
function as reminders, which ensure basic care processes
are adhered to (assuming whichever checklist is in place is
used correctly). At a broader level, checklists and their
usage have implications for team working, team cohesion,
and safety culture. Checklists require people to change
their work routines—for example, the Time Out phase of
the WHO SSC requires the entire operating theatre team to
gather and pause for a few seconds before proceeding with
a procedure. Given that the healthcare industry was rarely
using such interventions until recently, it has been argued
that checklists are not a panacea that will ﬁx every safety
problem—rather they are likely to interact with the team
and safety culture of the local team and wider organization.8
If signiﬁcant wider problems exist within an organization, the
likely outcome is that a checklist will not have a positive
beneﬁt, and indeed, it may be reduced to a tick box exercise.9
Along these lines, checklist-driven improvements have
been hypothesized to impact positively on team and safety
culture and, in turn, to drive decreases in patient mortality
and morbidity.6 Safety culture relates to personnel’s atti-
tudes, common thoughts, and behaviours within an organ-
ization.10 Although not easy to measure, a number of
surveys that assess safety culture have been published11—
alongside studies that investigate culture via ethnographic
approaches and observation.12 13 Survey instruments typical-
ly investigate a range of facets of culture, including team
working,14 15 communication,16 17 and attitudes to safety.18
Studies to date have linked occurrence of patient safety inci-
dents with safety culture and hence tools to monitor culture
within hospitals have been implemented.11 19
To date, the effects of the WHO SSC have been evaluated
regarding compliance,20 communication,21 22 staff attitudes,
and partly safety culture.18 22 23 Published studies are typic-
ally pre-/post-implementation designs without control groups.
The primary aim of this study was to measure the effects of
the WHO SSC on operating theatre personnel perceptions of
safety culture using a controlled study design. We hypothesize
that implementation of the SSC is associated with positive
changes in safety culture.
Methods
The study was reviewed by the Regional Committee for
Medical and Health Research Ethics (Ref: 2009/561) and the
hospital privacy Ombudsman, who approved it (Ref: 2010/
413). Written informed patient consent was waived. Operat-
ing theatre personnel gave consent by responding to the
surveys.
Study design
This was a prospective controlled intervention study using
pre- and post-intervention surveys with the intervention
and control groups. The primary outcome was the changes
of safety culture perceptions in operating theatre personnel
after implementation of the Norwegian version of the
WHO Surgical Safety Checklist, introduced after WHO
guidelines.5 A randomized stepped wedge design24 was uti-
lized to determine the order of intervention introduction
across three surgical specialities (orthopaedic, thoracic, and
neurosurgery—see the following section for details) in the
intervention site of the hospital. Compliance with checklist
usage was the secondary outcome.
Study population
The study took place in Haukeland University Hospital, a
1100-bed tertiary university hospital in the western part of
Norway. The perioperative setting comprised 10 surgical
departments and the accompanying departments of anaes-
thesia and intensive care administering anaesthesia and
perioperative care. The target population of perioperative
personnel included all eligible surgeons, anaesthetists, oper-
ating theatre nurses, nurse anaesthetists, and ancillary per-
sonnel (unit assistants, clerks, and cleaning assistants)
located at two separate sites. The intervention group com-
prised personnel from orthopaedic surgery, thoracic
surgery, and neurosurgery placed at the central hospital
site. The control group comprised personnel from ear, nose,
and throat; maxillofacial; plastic; endocrine; urology; gastro-
intestinal; obstetric; and gynaecological surgery specialities
located at the peripheral hospital site. Within the hospital,
operating theatre clinical and other personnel work in the
separate sites without rotation, except for a few anaesthe-
tists. Inclusion was based on work list information. A
census approach was taken for recruitment—with the entire
target population (as described above) invited to take part in
the study. A total of 349 participants responded at baseline
and 292 responded at post-intervention.
Study procedure
The study was carried out over 9 months from October 2009
to July 2010. Baseline and post-Checklist intervention survey
data were collected during two 4 week periods in October
2009 and June 2010 (Fig. 1). The surveys were forwarded
to the operating theatre personnel using both hospital elec-
tronic mail and the internal mail system (i.e. hardcopies).
Identiﬁcation numbers were assigned to or printed on each
questionnaire to match individuals for the pre- and post-
intervention surveys. Compliance with the Checklist was pro-
spectively recorded (i.e. Checklist ‘used’ or ‘not used’) via the
computer-based operating planning system within the oper-
ating theatres of the hospital. Nurse anaesthetists and
theatre nurses also checked manually whether the paper
versions of the Checklist had been completed for every case.
Checklist intervention
The Norwegian version of the SSC was introduced using a
randomized sequential roll-out of the intervention.24 In a
joint venture between the Norwegian National Unit for
Patient Safety, the Health Trust of Førde, and the Surgical
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Safety Study Group of Bergen, the Checklist was translated
and adapted to meet Norwegian surgical ﬂow of care. The
Checklist consisted of 20 items orally conﬁrmed by operating
theatre personnel aimed at ensuring patient safety during
anaesthesia and surgery. It was performed at three critical
junctures in care: before induction of anaesthesia (Sign In),
immediately before incision or start of treatment (Time
Out), and before the leading surgeon left the operating
theatre after surgery (Sign Out).5 The Sign In part before an-
aesthesia induction was led by the nurse anaesthetist. The
Time Out and Sign Out parts were led by the circulating
nurse. A completed checklist form was included into the
patient’s notes.
With management leaders support, the Surgical Safety
Study Group of Bergen introduced the SSC to all special-
ities/professional groups in the intervention group, using an
educational programme consisting of lectures, the NHS
(UK) videos on how to perform and not to perform the
checklist,25 information disseminated via e-mails, and WHO
guideline material5 translated into Norwegian. The SSC was
piloted during the two ﬁrst weeks of implementation result-
ing in a few minor adjustments—including that the Sign In
should be led by the nurse anaesthetist with anaesthetist
and operating theatre nurse present before induction, and
the Time Out should be performed by the operating theatre
nurse as the surgeon was ready to start the operation—
pausing the whole team. Further feedback was received by
end-users 2 weeks and also 2 months post-initial implemen-
tation. The randomized stepped wedge implementation
started with orthopaedic surgery followed by thoracic and
neurosurgery at 4 week intervals in the intervention site of
the hospital.
Outcome measures
The primary outcome was post-implementation changes in
safety culture measured by the Norwegian version of the
Healthcare Research and Quality Hospital Survey on Patient
Safety Culture (Hospital SOPS).19 26–28 The survey instrument
measures hospital staff perceptions of safety culture using 42
items that cover 12 factors, or elements of culture: ‘overall
patient safety’, ‘frequency of events reported’ (including
near misses in theatres), ‘unit manager/leader promoting
safety’, ‘organizational learning—continuous improvement’,
‘teamwork within units’, ‘communication openness’, ‘feed-
back on error reported’, ‘non-punitive response to errors’, ‘ad-
equate stafﬁng’ (to handle difﬁcult situations in theatre),
‘hospital manager/leader promoting safety’, ‘teamwork
across units’, and ‘quality of information handoffs and transi-
tions of care’.28 The ﬁrst nine factors address culture at clinical
unit level, whereas the last three factors address culture at the
wider hospital level. Items are scored on ﬁve-point agreement
scales (1, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly agree) or frequency
scales (1, never, to 5, always) as appropriate.19 28 The Hospital
SOPS instrument had previously not been used within this
hospital. The instrument was selected based on its very
good psychometric properties27–29 and also because we
could compare our ﬁndings with previous ﬁndings from
similar populations assessed using the same tool.27 28
Statistical analyses
Statistical analyses were carried out using SPSS version 20
(SPSS, Chicago, IL, USA). The reliability of the Norwegian Hos-
pital SOPS instrument in the form of internal consistency was
assessed using Cronbach’s a coefﬁcients. Descriptive
Pre-intervention
survey
(N = 575, n = 349)
october 2009
Control group
(n = 203)
Control group
(n = 152)
No intervention
Intervention group
(n = 146)
Intervention group
(n = 140)
Stepwise intervention
Neurosurgery
Thoracic surgery
Orthopaedic surgery
Checklist intervention
8 months time period
November 2009 – June 2010
Post-intervention
survey
(N = 569, n = 292)
June/July 2010
Fig 1 Study procedure for the SSC intervention and the pre-intervention and post-intervention surveys at Haukeland University Hospital,
Bergen, Norway, in 2009–2010. N, subjects included; n, subjects responded.
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statistics quantiﬁed sample characteristics and compliance
data. Each of the 12 patient safety culture factors was based
on three or four items, which were aggregated to produce a
mean score for the factor. Negatively worded items were
reversed to ensure that higher scores overall indicate better
safety culture. A mean sum score was calculated across all
12 factors. The intervention and control groups were com-
pared using analysis of variance (ANOVA). We used a hierarchical
mixed linear model (MLM) based on multiple regression ana-
lysis to calculate effects of the SSC intervention. Following sub-
jects responding both at baseline and post-intervention, the
MLM test allows for inclusion of subjects responding only at
baseline or post-intervention.30 The regression model is
detailed in the Appendix. Variations between responders and
non-responders were assessed with the Pearson x2 test. Stat-
istical signiﬁcance was set at two-tailed P≤0.05.
Results
Sample characteristics
A total of 641 participants took part in the study. Overall re-
sponse rates for the two phases of the study were 61% (349/
575) at the baseline/pre-intervention survey and 51% (292/
569) at the post-intervention survey. Subjects responding in
both surveys represented 67% (432/641) of the respondents.
Detailed sample characteristics are displayed in Table 1. We
performed a x2 analysis of non-responders to establish pos-
sible differences with responders regarding gender, groups,
and profession and found a signiﬁcant variation (P,0.01)
for professions in both surveys, with fewer non-responding
nurse anaesthetists in the pre- and post-intervention
surveys and more surgeons and ancillary personnel as non-
responders in the post-intervention survey. Checklist compli-
ance for the study period was 85% of all cases (elective and
emergency surgery) for the Sign In, 84% for the Time Out,
and 77% for the Sign Out (Table 2).
Norwegian ‘Hospital SOPS’ reliability
Reliability was assessed at baseline (n¼349) with lowest
Cronbach’s a of 0.60 and 0.64 for ‘adequate stafﬁng’ and
‘organizational learning and continuous improvement’ and
with the a ranging between 0.67 and 0.85 for the remaining
factors. At post-intervention (n¼292), the lowest a was 0.60
for ‘non-punitive response’ and ranged from 0.66 to 0.85 for
the other factors. Overall, these are acceptable to very good
levels of reliability for research purposes.
Checklist intervention effects on safety culture
Detailed descriptive analyses across the two groups (control
vs intervention) and the two time-points (pre-intervention
vs post-intervention) are presented in Table 3.
Table 1 Characteristics of the intervention (WHO SSC) and control groups (n¼641)
Pre-intervention survey Post-intervention survey
Checklist Control Total P-value Checklist Control Total P-value
n % n % n n % n % n
Occasion and groups 146 41.8 203 58.2 349 – 140 47.9 152 52.1 292 0.21
Gender
Male 64 43.8 80 39.4 144 0.44 65 46.4 52 34.2 117 0.04
Female 82 56.2 123 60.6 205 75 53.6 100 65.8 175
Profession ,0.01 ,0.01
Surgeon 44 30.1 83 40.9 127 32 22.9 60 39.5 92
Operating theatre nurse 35 24.0 42 20.7 77 36 25.7 35 23.0 71
Anaesthetist 24 16.4 20 9.9 44 31 22.1 10 6.6 41
Nurse anaesthetist 43 29.5 33 16.3 76 41 29.3 30 19.7 71
Ancillary personnel — — 25 12.3 25 — — 17 11.2 17
Patient contact 0.02 0.21
Yes 140 98.6 182 90.5 322 128 96.2 140 92.2 269
No 2 1.4 19 9.5 21 5 3.8 12 7.8 17
Weekly working hours
,20 2 1.4 15 7.5 17 1 0.7 5 3.3 6
20–37 59 40.7 80 39.8 139 53 38.4 63 41.9 116
.37 84 57.9 106 52.7 190 84 60.9 83 55.0 167
Hospital experience (yr) 0.97 0.43
,1 7 4.8 9 4.5 16 9 6.5 7 4.7 16
1–5 34 23.4 50 25.3 84 25 18.1 42 28.2 67
6–10 28 19.3 36 18.2 64 28 20.3 28 18.8 56
11–15 28 19.3 38 19.2 66 26 18.8 21 14.1 47
16–20 20 13.8 22 11.1 42 19 13.8 17 11.4 36
21–40 28 19.3 43 21.7 71 31 22.5 34 22.8 65
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The multivariate analysis with MLM demonstrated a sig-
niﬁcant effect (P,0.01) of the SSC intervention on the two
factors ‘frequency of events (near misses) reported’ and ‘ad-
equate stafﬁng’ (Fig. 2). The effect is described by regression
coefﬁcients for the interaction as 20.25 [95% conﬁdence
interval (CI), 20.47 to 20.07] and 0.21 (95% CI, 0.07–
0.35), respectively (Table 4). For instance, for ‘frequency of
events reported’, there was an increase of 0.11 from pre to
post in the control group, but a decrease in the Checklist
group (0.11–0.25¼20.14). For ‘adequate stafﬁng’, there is
hardly any change (b2¼20.07) in the control, but an increase
in the Checklist group (20.07+0.21¼0.14). For the safety
culture measured on the overall hospital level, the MLM ana-
lysis also showed a signiﬁcant effect of the Checklist inter-
vention for the factors ‘hospital management promotes
safety’ and ‘quality of information handoffs and transitions
of care’ in both groups. The regression coefﬁcients for the dif-
ferences were 0.12 (95% CI, 0.04–0.20) and 0.08 (95% CI,
0.02–0.14), respectively. The same pattern was obtained
when we adjusted the analyses using profession, gender,
level of patient contact, and work experience as covariates.
Subgroup analyses with covariates did not change the
results.
Across both baseline and post-intervention, we found sig-
niﬁcant group differences between the Checklist intervention
group and the control group, in favour of the intervention
group, for the factors ‘overall patient safety’, ‘frequency of
events reported’, ‘manager promoting safety’, ‘organizational
learning-continuous learning’, ‘teamwork within units’, ‘feed-
back/communication about errors’, ‘non-punitive response to
error’, and the ‘sum score’ (i.e. overall safety culture scale
mean score)—details of these differences are presented as
regression coefﬁcients with 95% CI in Table 4.
Discussion
In this prospective controlled intervention study of the WHO
SSC in Norway, the introduction of the Checklist was asso-
ciated with rather small impact on patient safety culture
(measured by the ‘Hospital SOPS’ scale). Overall, the interven-
tion group scored higher on a number of baseline culture
factors—but even taking this into account, we only found
positive effects on two dimensions of patient safety culture:
a signiﬁcant decrease in ‘frequency of events reported’ and
a signiﬁcant improvement in perceptions of ‘adequate staff-
ing’ in the Checklist intervention group. The decrease in
events reported could be associated with a real mitigation
of near misses or errors after the introduction of the WHO
Checklist in the intervention group. The SSC effects change
in theatre routines, such that team members may eventually
be better prepared for anaesthesia and surgery, hence
leading to fewer near misses. Improved safety processes in
the operating theatre have been seen after SSC implementa-
tion, such as raised awareness in the operating team and
foreseeing any errors or problems.6 31 In fact, the SURPASS
study quantiﬁed incidence of errors caught to 40.6% (2562/
6313) of checklists, supporting the assumption that check-
lists prevent near misses and errors.32 Direct observational
evidence would be required to further validate this ﬁnding.
The improvement in perceptions of having adequate staff-
ing to handle difﬁcult situations in theatre is more difﬁcult to
account for. During the study period, there was no objective
increase in stafﬁng as an explanatory variable. According to
data from the hospital personnel system, the number of
active health personnel was constant during the study
period and even the numbers on sick leave were not signiﬁ-
cantly different. It is possible that this effect is entirely sub-
jective—staff’s perceptions of teamwork have been shown
to be associated with measures of safety and quality in
patient care,33 and Bo˜hmer and colleagues22 found that
the team introductions during the Time Out contributed to
improved staff satisfaction. The use of the SSC, including
team introductions, might have enhanced team cohesion
and thus affected subjective perceptions of stafﬁng. This
ﬁnding clearly requires further investigation.
Checklist and safety culture
Is it possible for operating theatre teams to adopt a practice
which seems important to them but without broader
improvements in their attitudes to and perceptions of
safety? The safety culture factors that did not improve post-
implementation of the SSC in this study are somewhat differ-
ent from ﬁndings in other studies, especially regarding team-
work15 16 and communication.21 22 34
For checklist implementation to be effective, a concur-
rent cultural change within organizations has been sug-
gested to be crucial6 35 36—indeed, it has been argued
Table 2 Compliance with the WHO SSC in orthopaedic, thoracic, and neurosurgical operations (N¼2367) at Haukeland University Hospital,
Bergen, Norway, in 2009–2010
Surgery Use of SSC
N Sign In Time Out Sign Out All parts
n % n % n % n %
Orthopaedic 1579 1414 90 1386 88 1307 83 1264 80
Thoracic 393 337 86 338 86 300 76 287 73
Neuro 395 264 67 257 65 225 57 216 55
All 2367 2015 85 1981 84 1832 77 1767 75
P-value ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01
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that poor organizational culture and deeper-running pro-
blems can undermine the effectiveness of interventions
like checklists.9 Interestingly, the compliance rates with
the SSC in this study were rather high (85%, 84%, and
77% for the Sign In, Time Out, and Sign out phases, re-
spectively) which indicate fairly successful early implemen-
tation. Anecdotal evidence observed by and also relayed
to the research team also concurred that there were no
major problems. This compares favourably with ﬁndings
from other countries like the UK pilot implementation of
the SSC, which was met with some resistance and
compliance ranged from 42% to 80%.31 Strategies for suc-
cessful implementation of the SSC have included education
(training and materials), champions, organizational leader-
ship, clear roles in the team, regular audits, feedback, and
local adaptation5 31 36—which are all elements that we
used during implementation.
We thus have a rather paradoxical effect of a reasonably
successful introduction of the SSC intervention but no
major cultural impact. A number of explanations could be
put forward here—all of which are amenable to further
study. A ﬁrst possibility is that culture and SSC are
Table 3 Descriptive statistics analyses in the intervention (checklist) compared with control groups for the pre-intervention (n¼349) and
post-intervention (n¼292) phases of the study. SE, standard error; CI, conﬁdence interval
Safety factors (scale 1–5) Pre-intervention Post-intervention
Mean SE 95% CI Mean SE 95% CI
Overall patient safety
Intervention 3.63 0.05 3.53, 3.73 3.69 0.04 3.60, 3.77
Control 3.51 0.04 3.42, 3.60 3.57 0.05 3.48, 3.66
Frequency of events reported
Intervention 2.93 0.07 2.80, 3.06 2.77 0.06 2.66, 2.89
Control 2.72 0.05 2.62, 2.82 2.80 0.07 2.67, 2.93
Unit manager promoting safety
Intervention 3.78 0.06 3.66, 3.90 3.70 0.06 3.56, 3.82
Control 3.56 0.06 3.44, 3.67 3.52 0.07 3.38, 3.65
Organizational learning
Intervention 3.43 0.05 3.34, 3.53 3.50 0.05 3.41, 3.60
Control 3.27 0.05 3.18, 3.37 3.33 0.06 3.22, 3.45
Teamwork within units
Intervention 3.66 0.05 3.55, 3.76 3.72 0.05 3.62, 3.81
Control 3.55 0.04 3.46, 3.63 3.54 0.05 3.44, 3.64
Communication openness
Intervention 3.67 0.05 3.56, 3.78 3.61 0.06 3.50, 3.72
Control 3.52 0.04 3.43, 3.61 3.57 0.06 3.46, 3.68
Feedback/communication on error
Intervention 3.33 0.06 3.20, 3.45 3.21 0.06 3.08, 3.33
Control 3.07 0.05 2.98, 3.17 2.98 0.06 2.85, 3.10
Non-punitive response to error
Intervention 3.88 0.05 3.78, 3.98 3.89 0.04 3.80, 3.98
Control 3.68 0.05 3.57, 3.78 3.70 0.06 3.59, 3.82
Adequate stafﬁng
Intervention 3.44 0.05 3.34, 3.54 3.58 0.05 3.48, 3.67
Control 3.35 0.05 3.26, 3.45 3.29 0.06 3.17, 3.40
Hospital management promoting safety
Intervention 2.80 0.06 2.69, 2.93 2.90 0.06 2.78, 3.02
Control 2.86 0.05 2.76, 2.96 2.95 0.06 2.83, 3.07
Teamwork across units
Intervention 3.06 0.04 2.97, 3.14 3.03 0.04 2.94, 3.11
Control 3.08 0.04 3.00, 3.15 3.13 0.04 3.05, 3.21
Quality of handoffs and transitions
Intervention 3.03 0.05 2.93, 3.12 3.05 0.05 2.96, 3.15
Control 3.05 0.04 2.97, 3.13 3.17 0.05 3.08, 3.26
Sum mean score (12 factors)
Intervention 3.39 0.03 3.32, 3.45 3.39 0.03 3.32, 3.45
Control 3.27 0.03 3.20, 3.33 3.29 0.04 3.22, 3.36
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unrelated—but in the light of previous evidence, this is not
the likeliest possibility. Secondly, the baseline culture levels of
these services were already high—hence a ceiling effect pre-
vented further improvements. A third, related possibility
is that the timeline was too short to obtain such an
improvement—after all introducing a new procedure is fairly
quick, whereas a shift in experienced professionals’ mind sets
regarding their organization and practice might require a
longer gestation period. Both of these explanations require
longitudinal ongoing evaluations of culture and its ﬂuctua-
tions—and linking these with Checklist utilization. Cross-
sectional studies between different countries and healthcare
systems currently using the Checklist (e.g. Norway and
UK) would also be useful in this respect. Further, observational
assessments of how the SSC is actually used within the pressur-
ized theatre environment are also required—culture measures
are useful, but they cannot account for people reporting one
thing yet doing another. A fourth explanation is that people
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Fig 2 WHO SSC impact on safety culture perceptions of ‘frequency of events reported’ (near misses in theatres) and ‘adequate stafﬁng’ (to be
able to handle any difﬁcult situation in theatre), before and after the SSC intervention at Haukeland University Hospital, Bergen, Norway in
2009–2010. CI, conﬁdence interval.
Table 4 Effects on safety culture factors of the intervention (checklist) compared with control groups and pre-intervention (n¼349) vs
post-intervention (n¼292) survey phases estimated by the linear mixed model. †bi (i¼1, 2, 3), estimated regression coefﬁcients; b0, estimated
mean/constant; CI, conﬁdence interval; NS, not signiﬁcant and not included; †With interaction: y¼b0+b1.checklist group+b2.post intervention
survey+b3.checklist group×post intervention survey; without interaction: y¼b0+b1.checklist group+b2.post intervention survey+0. *P≤0.05;
**P≤0.01
Predictors Constant Differences for group
checklist vs control
Overall change post-
vs pre-intervention
survey
Checklist effect for
group3survey (pre/
post) interaction
Safety factors (scale 1–5) Items b0 95% CI b1 95% CI b2 95% CI b3 95% CI
Overall patient safety 4 3.49 3.43, 4.57 0.14 0.03, 0.24* 0.06 20.01, 0.13 NS —
Frequency of events reported 3 2.71 2.61, 2.81 0.20 0.04, 0.35* 0.11 20.02, 0.23 20.25 20.43, 20.07**
Unit manager promoting safety 4 3.54 3.44, 3.64 0.22 0.08, 0.36** 20.05 20.13, 0.03 NS —
Organizational learning 3 3.27 3.19, 3.35 0.16 0.04, 0.27** 0.07 20.00, 0.15 NS —
Teamwork within units 4 3.54 3.47, 3.62 0.14 0.03, 0.25** 20.01 20.08, 0.06 NS —
Communication openness 3 3.52 3.43, 3.60 0.11 20.01, 0.23 0.02 20.06, 0.09 NS —
Feedback/communication on error 3 3.03 2.97, 3.16 0.24 0.10, 0.37** 20.08 20.16, 0.01 NS —
Non-punitive response to error 3 3.65 3.57, 3.74 0.21 0.09, 0.33** 0.01 20.07, 0.09 NS —
Adequate stafﬁng 4 3.33 3.25, 3.42 0.10 20.04, 0.23 20.07 20.17, 0.03 0.21 0.07, 0.35**
Hospital management promoting
safety
3 2.84 2.75, 2.94 20.04 20.17, 0.10 0.12 0.04, 0.20** NS —
Teamwork across units 4 3.09 3.02, 3.15 20.05 20.14, 0.05 0.03 20.03, 0.09 NS —
Quality of handoffs and transitions 4 3.06 2.98, 3.13 20.04 20.15, 0.07 0.08 0.01, 0.14* NS —
SUM score (mean) 42 3.26 3.20, 3.31 0.12 0.04, 0.20** 0.02 20.02, 0.06 NS —
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can change their behaviour without necessarily visibly chan-
ging their underlying attitudes. Psychological theory suggests
that this cannot hold for a very long time, as people strive
to be consistent between their attitudes (i.e. perceptions of
culture) and their behaviour37 (i.e. usage of checklist)—which
makes more compelling the longitudinal evaluation of both
behaviour and culture perceptions.
Limitations and strengths
The response rate at baseline (61%) and at post intervention
(51%) might be a limitation for sample representativeness.
There were differences in professional backgrounds
between responders and non-responders (but not for other
patient characteristic factors). The signiﬁcant differences
within groups and variations within professions could indi-
cate study weaknesses, thus the MLM analysis30 adjusted
for these—and indeed inclusion of the covariates in the ana-
lyses did not inﬂuence the results. Finally, information about
the Checklist intervention and local enthusiasm could have been
transferred to individuals in the control group and biased results
(‘spill-over’ effect)—which is something that could not be con-
trolled. In balance, key strengths of this study are the use of a
carefully controlled design and matched assessments of safety
culture pre- and post-intervention at the individual participant
level (rather than group level).
Implications
Our ﬁndings, and overall experience with the study, have impli-
cations for the introduction of safety interventions, like the SSC,
and for further research on the effectiveness of such interven-
tions. In this study, seven of the safety culture factors showed
overall signiﬁcant differences between the intervention and
control groups, with the intervention group being signiﬁcantly
more positive. Following WHO advice, one could advocate
that implementation of an intervention should begin with
healthcare teams or professionals who are positive towards
the intervention—hence the concept of ‘champions’. This,
however, might be a challenge when designing evaluation
studies that include a control group, as entire units or operat-
ing theatres that are more positive towards the intervention
might show a ‘ceiling effect’—that is, the size of the improve-
ment triggered by the intervention is smaller in these groups
precisely because they are more positively predisposed to
the intervention to start with. Pre-/post-intervention designs
are not the most suitable to tease out such effects—and
indeed, we would argue that a deeper understanding of how
exactly a healthcare organization moves across dimensions
of culture over time cannot be gauged by such studies. We
would thus advocate periodic and systematic assessments
of an organization’s culture using a well-validated instrument.
This will allow longitudinal, time-series-based evaluation of
whether the organization (or parts of it) moves in a certain dir-
ection, and whether interventions are causing such shifts.
Further, feedback of such measures within the organization
can provide better self-insight and allow clinical units to self-
evaluate and to compare themselves with their peers. We
would hypothesize that such organization-wide assessments
are an intervention in themselves and that a positive relation-
ship should be expected between them and organizational
readiness to improve safety and quality and to adopt novel
interventions. These hypotheses await further study.
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Appendix
The aim of the MLM regression analysis is to describe the
effect of the checklist intervention on primary outcome; the
safety culture factors of the Hospital SOPS (dependent vari-
ables) with intervention and control groups at baseline and
post-intervention surveys (independent variables).
A hierarchical model was formed for the interaction and
expressed as:
Y = b0 + b1 × Group+ b2 × Survey+ b3
× Group× Survey (A1)
where b0 is the model constant/intercept, b1,2,3 the regres-
sion coefﬁcients (estimated by restricted maximum likelihood
methods), Group the independent variable as intervention
(¼1) or control (¼0) group, and Survey the independent vari-
able as baseline survey (¼1) and post-intervention (¼0) survey.
The models assume covariance type CSR (compound sym-
metry with correlation parameterization) for repeated response
from subjects at baseline and at post-intervention. The ana-
lyses also include respondents replying only at baseline or post-
intervention. Independent variables were ﬁxed. To adjust for
co-variables, we included profession, gender, patient contact,
and work experience in the hospital in the models:
Y = b0 + b1 × Group+ b2 × Survey+ b3
× Profession+ · · · + b8 × Group× Survey (A2)
For safety culture factors without signiﬁcant interaction effects
of the checklist intervention, we used an equation for asses-
sing the variations between groups and between surveys:
Y = b0 + b1 × Group+ b2 × Survey (A3)
Equations (A1) and (A3) are used in Table 4.
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